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“First Law of Law: You can't invent the wheel without bending the rules.”  
Leonid S. Sukhorukov; ‘All About Everything.’ 
 
“If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the law.  
It invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy.”  
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis; ‘Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438.’ 
 
“Our democracy is self-destructing, because it abused the right of freedom and equality, 
because it taught the citizens to see audacity as a right, illegality as a freedom, the people's 
audacity of speech as equality, and anarchy as bliss.” 
Isocrates. 
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1 Introduction 
This is the final in a series of three papers addressing the phenomenon of ‘computerized 
bureaucracy,’ and its wider impact on modern organizations. The first two were written with 
joint author Professor Ian Angell. In the first paper, we introduced and raised the issue of 
computerized bureaucracy by identifying a distinct form of bureaucracy that comes with the 
use of computerized systems (Angell and Samonas, 2009). In the second paper, we presented 
a sound theoretical framework for the analysis and discussion of the central role that power, 
trust and discretion play in IS security; in the same paper, we also discussed the benefits that 
stem from active, as opposed to passive, discretion in organizations (Samonas and Angell, 
2009). In the discussion of our second paper, we highlighted the importance of Feldman’s 
research findings, according to which, the introduction of discretion lies on the selection of 
the ‘right’ people, the level and quality of their training and the involvement of the to top 
management discretion can prove to be beneficial for the organizational integrity of a firm, 
(Samonas and Angell, 2009). 
 
A closer look at active discretion led us to the widely misused concept of ‘autonomy’, and so, 
this present paper will conclude the trilogy by highlighting the conceptual relationship 
between bureaucracy, discretion and autonomy. Since autonomy is often confused with 
notions of autocracy or anarchy, and in many cases the term is used as a pejorative, an 
elaborate working definition of autonomy is presented here, based on the philosophical work 
of Cornelius Castoriadis. The consideration of autonomy within an ‘organizational integrity’ 
context (Angell and Samonas, 2009; Angell and Smithson, 1991), raises a range of interesting 
issues, and opens up new research paths that are worthy of exploration by security 
professionals and academics alike.  
 
Reflecting on certain pragmatic aspects of rule bending triggers the discussion on autonomy; 
rule bending is certainly not a recent phenomenon and it is one that can have serious 
ramifications for the systemic integrity and security of an organization. Rule bending is 
attributed to a number of different reasons and it is usually the result of a conscious choice 
that individuals make. Rule bending in the workplace is definitely not compatible with the 
traditional theoretical perspectives on bureaucracy. In this respect, we are interested in how 
can rule bending possibly fit with the modern theories and practice of bureaucracy. 
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For this reason, we examine one of the most fundamental theoretical premises of bureaucracy, 
the property of non-inclusiveness, according to which, individuals as persons are separated 
from the roles they serve in a bureaucracy (Kallinikos, 2006). We lay emphasis on the 
shortcomings of non-inclusiveness and particularly, in the way it is evolving in the ‘post-
bureaucratic’ era. Having the inherent incompatibility of rule bending and non-inclusiveness 
as a point of reference, we argue that rule bending can be integrated into modern 
organizational structures and arrangements, but not as a form of staff resistance or negation to 
the established organizational processes and procedures; rather, as a creative contribution that 
can make a positive impact on the organization.   
 
Of course, neither hierarchies and controls can possibly be eliminated from modern 
organizations (Hopfl, 2006), nor the pragmatic dimensions of rule bending can be ignored. 
So, taking into account the need for cultivating active discretion in organizations (Samonas 
and Angell, 2009), we go on to explore the potential merits of managing with autonomy as a 
way of mitigating the risks generated in bureaucracy and by extension, in computerized 
bureaucracy. However, we are not considering autonomy as a panacea and therefore we also 
see autonomy as a risk; that is, as both an opportunity and a hazard. The point is not to offer 
universal solutions and categories, but to approach the implications of computerized 
bureaucracy in a balanced and pragmatic way.  
 
So, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to understand better the mechanics of autonomy and 
investigate whether the ‘autonomous manager’ can indeed mitigate the risks of computerized 
bureaucracy; and most importantly, under what conditions and circumstances. In order to do 
so, we provide an etymological and historical account of autonomy and then compare and 
contrast autonomy with related terms, like freedom, autocracy and anarchy. With the latter 
term as a point of reference, we attempt to situate rule bending under the conceptual umbrella 
of autonomy, mainly by relating rule bending with law breaking and defiance. 
 
In the discussion that concludes the paper, we first refer to the paradigm of bureaucracy and 
its theoretical implications regarding non-inclusiveness and rule bending. We then illustrate 
the significance of autonomy for organizational integrity by presenting a few key arguments 
for, as well as against autonomy. With respect to security as organizational integrity, we argue 
that active discretion and autonomy can be developed primarily through a carefully planned 
and ongoing education programme that does not aim at simply informing staff about issues of 
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organizational integrity. The ultimate purpose of introducing autonomy, is to enable staff to 
deal with unexpected, ‘singular,’ unique and irregular situations (Angell and Samonas, 2009; 
Samonas and Angell, 2009).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we look into the phenomenon of rule bending, by 
presenting an interesting sample of the relevant literature that has only recently started to 
develop considerably. Second, we attempt to show that bureaucracy operates as a closed 
system. In the third section of the paper, the notion of autonomy as openness is being 
introduced, as directly opposed to the closure that bureaucracy stands for. Finally, we go on to 
discuss the role that autonomy can play in modern organizations with regard to information 
systems security.  
 
2 Bending the Rules 
2.1 Failing safely 
The popular novel entitled ‘Fail-Safe,’ which was inspired by Cold War tensions, describes 
the fictional events that took place during the course of a single day, and that led to an 
accidental nuclear war between the USA and the Soviet Union (Burdick and Wheeler, 1962).  
 
US Air Force radar operators detect an unknown aircraft coming from Europe and heading to 
the USA. A group of American supersonic bombers are scrambled to approach and eliminate 
the potential threat, which is attributed to the Soviet Union. While they are on their way, the 
unknown aircraft is eventually identified, and is no longer considered a threat. As a standard 
fail-safe protection, the bombers have standing orders not to proceed past a certain point 
without having received a special attack code from the Pentagon. However, due to a technical 
failure, the attack code is transmitted over the radio. The commander of the bomber group 
tries to verify the fail-safe attack order, but radio jamming from the Soviets makes this 
impossible. 
  
Taking the fail-safe attack order and the radio jamming into consideration, the commander 
concludes that a nuclear war has broken out, and decides to head to Moscow and attack the 
city with their nuclear bombs. The novel develops in a largely exaggerated fashion, and 
culminates with the destruction of both Moscow and New York. 
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Regardless that these events are fictional, its ironic title is itself worthy of note. The concept 
of ‘fail-safe,’ which is used in engineering and quality controls, encompasses both the 
possible ways in which things can go wrong, and the processes or functions that will ensure 
things will not get worse. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (Unknown, 2009), a fail-
safe operation minimizes the chance that a computer failure or some other accident would set 
off a major catastrophe. A fail-safe device or operation is different from a fail-secure one; a 
failure in the fail-safe device disables its security features, whereas a failure in a fail-secure 
device enables the security features of the latter. It is therefore ironic, that the assumed failure 
caused by the alleged Soviet attack could trigger a completely inappropriate ‘safeguarding’ 
process, which led the commander to follow the last authenticated orders at all costs, and 
eventually bombard Moscow.  
 
Fortunately, in reality, things did not turn out to be so dramatic for humanity, although a 
nuclear war and even a Third World War could have easily broken out (Phillips, 2000). 
During the Cold War, the USA and the Soviet Union were following the doctrine of ‘mutually 
assured destruction’, which was based on ‘deterrence through the balance of terror’ (Gaddis, 
1987; Little, 1998). This clearly implied that any attack would be immediately followed by 
counterattack; and so, thousands of nuclear missiles were being targeted on enemy cities, at 
all times (Little, 1998). In more than 20 recorded cases, an accidental nuclear war would be 
inevitable on the basis of retaliation, if army officials on both sides had not identified and 
treated false alarms as such.  
 
Despite the use of sophisticated and advanced technology, mere coincidences and/or 
technology failures have set off numerous false alarms over the years. Here is an indicative 
list of incidents, each of which could have become the cause of a large-scale nuclear war 
(Phillips, 2000; Sagan, 1993; Webb, 2001): 
− A flock of geese and the rising moon were mistaken for incoming missiles. Only on last 
minute checks was the firing of several missiles avoided. (1960)  
− A flight of swans was mistaken for an unidentified aircraft. (1956) 
− A satellite in orbit was misidentified as two possible missiles over Georgia. (1962) 
− A small routine air force escort for the president of Syria, who was returning from a visit to 
Moscow, was mistaken for ‘100 Soviet MIG-15's flying over Syria’. (1956) 
− The coincidental failure of all the communication systems between the North American 
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Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Strategic Air Command Headquarters, 
due to an overheated motor at a relay station in Colorado. This incident was considered 
sabotage, until the two commands established radio communication and confirmed that 
there was no enemy attack whatsoever. (1961) 
− The loading of a ‘War Games’ simulation tape into NORAD computers, by mistake. 
Eventually, it was confirmed that there were no incoming missiles on the radar. (1979) 
− A single faulty chip that was failing randomly. The basic design of the system was faulty, 
allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive display at several command posts. (1980) 
 
Interestingly enough, in all these cases, a nuclear war was averted not only due to the various 
fail-safe mechanisms that have been put in place in the warning and launch systems; but most 
importantly, thanks to the responsible and sensible actions of those who were in the chain of 
command when the fail-safe features had failed (Phillips, 2000; Sagan, 1993).  
 
2.2 Rule bending 
In the USS Vincennes tragedy, which was discussed in our first paper that introduced the 
concept of computerized bureaucracy, the decision to shoot down the commercial airliner was 
attributed to the ‘glass-cockpit syndrome,’ a term coined to illustrate how omnipresent 
computer screens distract and cause confusion (Angell and Samonas, 2009). This syndrome 
has two effects: end users rely entirely on the system without exercising any kind of judgment 
of the situation; the ensuing information overload results in users ignoring many pieces of, 
sometimes very important, information (Angell and Samonas, 2009). In the ‘Fail-safe’ 
scenario, the commander of the bomber group followed the last order he received regarding 
the nuclear bombing of Moscow, with him having no doubts about either what had really 
happened, or his following the order at all costs. On the night of 26th September 1983, 
Stanislav Petrov, a Soviet army software engineer, took a different and much more 
challenging path, having serious doubts about the credibility of the satellite signals of a Soviet 
early-warning computer system. His fascinating story was made known to the public 15 years 
after his actions had made him the ‘man who saved the world’ (Little, 1998). 
 
Petrov was a young lieutenant colonel in charge of 200 men at a surveillance centre near 
Moscow. While being on duty, the screen in front of him ‘turned bright red’ and the alarm 
went off, five times in total; as he recalls, the alarm was so loud that it could ‘raise a dead 
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man from his grave’ (Little, 1998). The computer system indicated that the Soviet Union was 
under nuclear attack from the USA and therefore, the standard procedure for such a case, had 
to be followed. The orders were to inform the chain of command immediately, so that they 
could in turn inform the General Secretary, who would finally decide on behalf of the Soviet 
Union (Little, 1998). If Petrov had strictly followed the orders that he was given, a nuclear 
counterattack would have been launched within minutes. Instead, he decided to pick up the 
phone and let his superiors know that the alarms were false and that there was no attack under 
way.  
 
His decision to bend the rules and disobey the orders he had been given was mainly intuitive. 
He thought than an American attack would be massive and it would not consist of just 5 
missiles (Hoffman, 1999); he also took into account the fact that ground radars had not picked 
up any enemy missiles and that the early-warning system had flaws, as it had been rushed into 
service (Hoffman, 1999). In a blink of an eye, Petrov had to convince himself first about the 
rightfulness of his decision, before explaining to his superiors what had happened and why 
there was no reason for retaliation. 
 
He was initially praised for his actions. However, after the completion of the formal 
investigation regarding the computer fault, he was blamed and treated as a scapegoat, rather 
than being rewarded for his courage and quick thinking during such enormously stressful 
circumstances (Hoffman, 1999; Little, 1998). He was even accused for not producing lengthy 
reports and for not taking detailed notes of the events, as and when they happened (Hoffman, 
1999); of course, that was a far from easy task when ‘electronic maps and consoles were 
flashing as he held a phone in one hand and juggled an intercom in the other, trying to take in 
all the information at once’ (Hoffman, 1999). A few years later, Petrov retired early from the 
army and suffered a nervous breakdown (Little, 1998). 
 
Petrov’s story is, by and large, indicative of the way the military operates as an institution. In 
the military, orders are made to be followed, usually without any further thoughts or any kind 
of reflection on the implications that these orders may have. However, very much unlike 
Petrov’s case, rules and laws can be bent within an authoritarian environment and sometimes 
for highly controversial causes. Stylianos Pattakos, for example, a Greek brigadier general 
and one of the leaders of the Greek military junta of 1967, still believes firmly that his illegal 
actions to displace the government then, were actually helping the country escape a major 
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political turbulence and a wider socio-economic crisis. Almost a year after the coup d'état, he 
stated that: 
 
“Το Σύνταγµα και οι νόµοι εκοιµήθησαν, αλλά η πατρίς εσώθη –  
The Constitution and the laws were put aside, but the country was saved.” 
 
Pattakos, a military man, intentionally diverged from the State’s rules and procedures, 
claiming that ‘saving’ the country was his first priority. He would certainly not agree with 
Plato’s view that ‘good people do not need laws to tell them to act responsibly, while bad 
people will find a way around the laws’ - a moral and somewhat oversimplified statement that 
does not address the diversity and the complexity of contemporary organizations (Plato, 
2000). So, rule bending can indeed occur within authoritarian environments such as the 
military and in certain occasions, like for example a military junta, it can even lead to an 
autocratic mode of governance that is tailored to the interests of the power holders. It would, 
therefore, be particularly interesting to see how rule bending actually works in other 
environments, less authoritarian than the army. 
 
For over 60 years, studies of public sector bureaucracy were mostly preoccupied with rule-
following (as opposed to rule bending), and the characteristics of the ‘rule bound’ personality 
(DeHart-Davis, 2007). However, a recent stream of research, focused mainly on public sector 
bureaucracies, is now dealing with the ‘unbureaucratic’ personality, namely with the traits of 
a person who is willing to bend organizational rules and procedures. The goal of this kind of 
research is to sketch the profile of the creative, entrepreneurial, and flexible public servant 
now being mentioned in the latest government literature; (DeHart-Davis, 2007). According to 
relevant research findings, staff at all hierarchical levels bend rules, although this appears to 
be more the exception than the rule; moreover, public servants bend rules in the name of 
‘customer service,’ and exercise significant discretion to achieve government-required results 
(DeHart-Davis, 2007). 
 
According to DeHart-Davis (2007), nonconformity, risk taking, red tape and centralized 
workplaces seem to increase the unbureaucratic personality, whereas rule-following is greater, 
when public service commitment is high or in formalized workplaces. Rule-benders 
knowingly and intentionally depart from the prescribed organizational procedures, with the 
notable exception of the pathological case of the ‘bureautic,’ who genuinely detests control, 
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and perceives all organizational tasks, processes etc., as red tape (Thompson, 1977). In 
general, it could be argued that the occurrence of rule-bending is influenced by individual 
dispositions, one’s work objectives, as well as by the position of staff within the 
organizational structure (Blau, 1963). The case of street-level bureaucrats, who bend rules 
because they ultimately see them as a barrier to their job performance, is indicative of Blau’s 
view on rule-bending, and it was extensively discussed in our first paper on computerized 
bureaucracy (Angell and Samonas, 2009; DeHart-Davis, 2007). The next section presents a 
more careful examination of rule bending in bureaucracies, highlighting the contrast between 
discretion and the bureaucratic property of ‘non-inclusiveness’. 
 
3 Bureaucracy as a closed system 
3.1 Non-inclusiveness in bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy is a governance system that operates upon premises made routine during 
problem solving and decision-making in ‘typical’ or ‘regular’ situations (Angell and 
Samonas, 2009; Inbar, 1979). Taking the Weberian notion, bureaucracy is closely related to 
that of formal organizations, which are centred around a specific regime of rules and 
regulations defined by various legal, administrative and political processes (Clegg et al., 
2006; Kallinikos, 2006). In this respect, bureaucracy is based on institutionalized power 
relations that are shaped by complex cultural and social developments, and should, therefore, 
be seen as an institution, rather than just an organizational arrangement (Du Gay, 2005; 
Kallinikos, 2006).  
 
Most of the criticism of bureaucracy is related to the suppression of individual autonomy, as 
well as the limited ability of bureaucracy to be flexible and adapt to the changing conditions 
of the environment (Inbar, 1979; Kallinikos, 2004; 2006). A fairly recent stream of literature 
argues that the use of the term ‘bureaucracy’ as a pejorative (Angell and Samonas, 2009; 
Fineman et al., 2005) is oversimplified, and largely exaggerated (Du Gay, 2005; Kallinikos, 
2004; 2006). Bureaucracy has been passionately and fiercely attacked over the years, mostly 
by radical structuralists and humanists alike; that is, by scholars whose ontology lays 
particular emphasis on conflict and radical change (Burrell and Morgan, 1985; Kallinikos, 
2004; 2006). This is clearly illustrated in the diverse list of critics of bureaucracy, that range 
from classical liberals, like Friedrich von Hayek, to libertarian socialists, like Cornelius 
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Castoriadis (Kallinikos, 2004). However, the defenders of bureaucracy argue for the unique 
qualities it demonstrates as an institution, and its unparalleled contribution to modernity. 
 
Historically, bureaucracy has introduced groundbreaking social innovations as an institution, 
mainly through the consolidation and enforcement of freedoms and egalitarian rights 
(Foucault and Rabinow, 1986; Kallinikos, 2004; 2006). The early stages of modern 
bureaucracy can be traced back to the Napoleonic times, when a new modality of power was 
formed and established through the imposition of discipline on the administrative apparatus, 
which was essentially inspired by the values of the French Revolution (Foucault and 
Rabinow, 1986). So, along with the standardization of rules and procedures, bureaucracy has 
developed a set of core properties over time, which are based on principles like equality, 
impersonality, hierarchical accountability, meritocracy and non-inclusiveness (Du Gay, 2005; 
Kallinikos, 2004; 2006). The latter is a particularly interesting feature of bureaucracy, and 
stands out from the rest, mostly because of its inherent conceptual complexity. 
 
3.2 The paradox of non-inclusiveness 
Non-inclusiveness denotes that organizations are not comprised of individuals, but rather of a 
complex set of interdependent abstract operational requirements; namely roles that individuals 
are expected to meet (Du Gay, 2005; Kallinikos, 2004; 2006). However, this definition entails 
two major implications. First, it means that organizations are, in effect, constituted by roles 
through the institutional introduction and reproduction of the very distinctions that roles bring 
(Kallinikos, 2004; 2006). Second, the individuals who join the organization are entirely 
separated from the roles they are called to fulfill and serve; the very fact that, ideally, there is 
no favouritism or discrimination in the recruitment process, since it is just a matter of 
matching the requirements of the role to the qualifications of the candidates, accounts for 
much of the historical significance of bureaucracy as an iconic symbol of modernity (Du Gay, 
2005; Kallinikos, 2004; 2006).  
 
Non-inclusiveness is, nonetheless, central in bureaucracy and this is even illustrated in the use 
of this property as the sole criterion for the identification of an organizational form as a 
bureaucracy (Kallinikos, 2006). According to Kallinikos (2006), bureaucracy is a highly 
adaptive system that can reach a considerable degree of internal coherence and consistency, 
due to its property of non-inclusiveness. He argues that the systematic and consistent 
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separation of the functional requirements of bureaucracy from its surrounding social and 
human complexity can actually make this feasible (Kallinikos, 2006). In this view, the major 
contribution of non-inclusiveness is that it has introduced features like selectivity, mobility 
and reversibility in the relationship between the individual and the organization. These 
features enable bureaucracy to redesign its components and processes, and therefore to adapt 
to the changing environment by producing the much needed variety (Ashby, 1958). On this 
basis, Kallinikos (2006) argues that contemporary organizations will only be able to address 
contingencies when they reassemble the standardised components of bureaucracy 
(procedures, tasks, jobs, etc.), in a way that produces novel outcomes, and provided that 
individuals are tied to organizations in selective, mobile and reversible forms. In other words, 
organizations need to draw their operational strategies and business plans by referring back to 
the classic Weberian definition of bureaucracy.  
 
However, it appears that non-inclusiveness is inherently problematic, both in theory and 
practice. In theoretical terms, non-inclusiveness is an elusive and self-referential concept, 
mostly because its use as a property of bureaucracy entails two different kinds of distinction. 
First, it primarily refers to the distinction between the roles and the individuals who are 
performing those roles; and second, since each role is an operational arrangement, non-
inclusiveness also indirectly refers to the distinction between the operations that are assigned 
to a certain role, and the operations assigned to all other different roles. It should be noted 
though, that it is possible to have an operation assigned simultaneously to two or more roles. 
However, we are solely interested in the process of distinction and separation of operations; 
that is, in the categorization of operations, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the creation of any role. So, non-inclusiveness ultimately refers to one direct and one indirect 
distinction (see Figure 1). 
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The problem with both distinctions is that they unavoidably give rise to the Fallacy of the 
Residual Category (Demetis and Angell, 2007; Luhmann, 1995; 2002). In other words, each 
of these distinctions produces paradoxical residual categories, and in essence they introduce 
risk, by ignoring and/or underestimating the truncated couplings that are being created and 
formed in the very process of distinction (Demetis and Angell, 2007; Luhmann, 1993; 1995; 
Samonas and Angell, 2009). Another related problem stems from the fact that, just like most 
theories, the theory on bureaucracy presupposes an observer who is making a first-order 
observation. In this observation, the observer, who is also the theoretician of bureaucracy, 
categorises the world in a supposedly ‘objective’ way, and in the case of non-inclusiveness he 
distinguishes the role from the individual (Gabriel et al., 1999; Luhmann, 1993; 1995). 
Practically, this means that the observer does not take into account the possibility of him 
being the n-th observer; in other words, the possibility that other, n-1 observations and thus 
distinctions have already been made a priori, before his.  
 
Furthermore, non-inclusiveness is inherently paradoxical for another reason; the underlying 
assumption is that the individual involved in the direct distinction, is not and can never be a 
completely impartial observer. Contrary to the assertions of bureaucratic theory, the 
individual does not operate within the one-dimensional description ascribed to the role 
(Gabriel et al., 1999). The individual can and does interpret the role and most importantly, he 
can and does make his own categories to understand the world, possibly on a basis different to 
that of the observer/theoretician (Gabriel et al., 1999). Particularly in modern bureaucracies, it 
Direct	  distinction	  
Figure 1: Non-inclusiveness and the introduction of distinctions. 
 
Indirect	  distinction	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is only pragmatic to consider that the definitions and interpretations of the world that different 
individuals shape and use in a workplace are divergent and largely incompatible. Non-
inclusiveness cannot easily, if at all, explain the range of problematic situations that stem 
from typical political behaviours within organizations, like whistle blowing (Farrell and 
Petersen, 1982), or organizational pathologies like role ‘stress’ (Fineman et al., 2005; Handy, 
1993). All these situations are instances of inclusiveness that can be found in any 
contemporary form of bureaucracy.  
 
3.3 Non-inclusiveness in ‘post-bureaucracy’ 
Kallinikos (2006) notes that the boundaries of the separation of work, family and community 
that sustained the property of non-inclusiveness in organizations are nowadays blurred; but, of 
course, the problem is that these boundaries started to blur more than 30 years ago. The 
problematic nature of non-inclusiveness was initially and partly discussed in seminal studies 
of the 1970s and 1980s that dealt with the diffusion of information technology and its 
implications for the nature and in particular the future of work, organizations and 
management (Toffler, 1970; Zuboff, 1984).  
 
The ‘line between home and work’ is considered fictional (Fineman et al., 2005; Gabriel et 
al., 1999), and thus it can only be of limited use in abstract theoretical models that refer to 
simplified accounts of bureaucracy. In practice, the separation between the role and the 
individual is perhaps not the one described in non-inclusiveness, at least not in the first 
instance; rather, it is an emotional distinction that the individual himself makes. Recent 
studies indicate that individuals treat their roles and jobs with resentment and ultimately, 
cynicism (Fleming and Spicer, 2007; Gabriel et al., 1999; Gouldner, 1957); individuals do not 
believe in the roles they are assuming, and actively ‘dis-identify’ with the organizations they 
work in, as well as with the products or services that they produce (Fleming and Spicer, 
2007).  
 
On the other hand, it is certainly ironic that organizations consistently try to keep the 
individuals attached to their roles and the organization by building ‘psychic prisons’ around 
them (Gabriel, 2005; Gabriel et al., 1999; Morgan, 1997). The cynicism with which 
individuals treat their jobs could be seen as an advanced form of resistance, an act of 
disobedience and defiance to the post-modern bureaucratic controls that essentially use 
© Samonas 2009 14 
language, emotion, space and exposure (Gabriel, 2005). Psychological contracts, electronic 
surveillance and conspicuous consumption are only some of the developments, which mark 
the shift from the physical domination of institutional control and discipline, to the pursuit of 
the cognitive domination of individuals (Foucault, 1979; Gabriel, 2005; Gabriel et al., 1999; 
Kallinikos, 2006). It is the shift from the ‘iron cage’ of the bureaucratic ideal, to the ‘glass 
cages and glass palaces’ of late modernity, the so-called ‘soft’ bureaucracies (Courpasson, 
2000; Courpasson and Clegg, 2006; Courpasson and Dany, 2003; Gabriel, 2005).  
 
Indeed, modern bureaucracies are the result of ‘a new empirical configuration, an empirical 
hybridity’ that has developed over the years, moving bureaucracy away from the Weberian 
ideal and its classical definition (Courpasson, 2000; Courpasson and Clegg, 2006). However, 
at the end of the day, bureaucracy is a theoretical construct, a device that is being used in 
order to explain and reflect on specific behaviours, decisions and sets of epistemological and 
ontological presuppositions, which are employed in organizations. It is the special lens we use 
to capture a snapshot of all the organizational paradigms that are primarily based on 
standardization, lack of autonomy and individual freedom. In this respect, bureaucracy cannot 
possibly be a bringer of change, nor can it adapt to the changing environment. Bureaucracy, 
as an organizational arrangement, can and does change, but not in itself; only the individuals 
who comprise bureaucracy essentially can change it. Therefore, bureaucracy is not changing 
because of its property of non-inclusiveness and the selectivity, mobility and reversibility that 
the property itself entails; but rather, because the people working in bureaucratic 
organizations are substantially changing their modus operandi over time, for all sorts of 
reasons. The evolution of computerized bureaucracy is one fine example of this operational 
transformation (Angell and Samonas, 2009). 
 
Let us now turn to autonomy, by trying to explore its meaning, but most of al, its potential for 
modern organizations. 
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4 Autonomy as openness 
4.1 What is autonomy? 
In modern English, autonomy is defined as the freedom for a country, a region or an 
organization to govern itself independently; or, the ability of an individual to act and make 
decisions without being controlled by anyone else (Hornby et al., 2000). Etymologically, the 
word ‘autonomy’ comes from the Greek term autonomia (αυτονοµία < αυτο + νόµος = self + 
law), which is equivalent to the English term ‘self-rule’ and was first applied to the Ancient 
Greek city-state. Each city was autonomous, in that its citizens were making their own laws 
(Castoriadis and Curtis, 1992).  
 
Autonomy is usually seen as a moral, political, and social ideal and as such, it is a rather 
ambiguous concept. Its use has been quite problematic (Dworkin, 1988), due to:  
− The inherent difficulty of defining the term in a consistent and coherent way, as well as the 
inappropriate use of the term by different scholars. 
− The weak assumptions used in theories of autonomy; most theories on autonomy assume 
that an autonomous person will or must be virtuous, non-neurotic, rational etc. 
− The little attention it had received over many years in Philosophy. 
 
In various theories and frameworks, autonomy has been treated as the equivalent of freedom, 
sovereignty, freedom of the will, dignity, integrity, individuality, independence and 
responsibility; furthermore, it has been associated with an individual’s thoughts, actions, 
beliefs, the reasons for acting, rules, the will of other persons, self-assertion, critical 
reflection, freedom from obligation, absence of external causation and knowledge of one's 
own interests (Dworkin, 1988). Actually, the only thing these conceptualizations have in 
common is that autonomy involves people being able to shape their own lives in important 
ways, and that it is a desirable quality (Dworkin, 1988).   
 
Let us now see some notable similarities and differences between the various connotations of 
autonomy, and more specifically its relationship to autocracy and philosophical anarchism. 
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4.2 Autocracy, autonomy, anarchy 
Among all the concepts that are being used as synonymous to autonomy, freedom, power, 
privacy, autocracy and anarchy stand out for a number of reasons. All these terms do share 
common conceptual grounds, but despite their similarities, they are definitely not the same, 
and they all do have distinct meanings. 
 
Freedom, power and privacy are not the same as autonomy; however, they are absolutely 
necessary for individuals to develop their own aims, interests and values (Dworkin, 1988). 
Autonomy is a much richer notion than freedom, since the latter is simply conceived either as 
mere absence of interference to one’s actions, decisions etc, or as offering different 
alternatives (Dworkin, 1988). In this respect, autonomy is bound up with the idea that the 
individual is a subject, rather than a passive spectator of someone else’s desires and feelings 
(Dworkin, 1988). On the other hand, the link of autonomy with autocracy and anarchy is both 
linguistic and historical, and it could be argued that it is as strong as that with freedom, power 
and privacy.  
 
Autocracy is a system of government, in which one person has complete power (Hornby et 
al., 2000). As one can readily notice, autocracy and autonomy both derive from the same root 
word auto-, which means ‘self.’ The second part of ‘autocracy’ is the word kratos (κράτος), 
which originally means ‘strength,’ but in English it is the equivalent of ‘state.’ The word 
autokrator (αυτοκράτωρ < αυτο + κράτος = self + state) is a derivative of the Greek word 
autokratia (αυτοκρατία), which literally means ‘self-ruler;’ however, its English equivalent is 
the word ‘emperor.’ Conceptually, autocracy is also linked to tyranny and dictatorship. 
Interestingly enough, in Greek mythology Kratos or Cratos personifies power and strength. 
He is the brother of Nike (Νίκη = victory), Via (Βία = violence), and Zelus (Ζήλος = zeal), 
who all were the enforcers of Zeus, and the protectors of his throne.  
 
Anarchy, on the other hand, derives from the Greek word anarchia (αναρχία < privative affix 
α + αρχή = lack of authority) and in English, it is defined as lawlessness and lack of 
government, order or control in a country or organization, etc. (Hornby et al., 2000). Anarchy 
is widely used as a pejorative to denote disorder, confusion and chaos; however, the 
conception that anarchy is a synonym of chaos is not only over-simplistic, but also inherently 
paradoxical, especially if one takes into consideration that order is a fundamental premise of 
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Chaos Theory! It seems that anarchy does have a more subtle meaning, which is closely 
related to the concept of autonomy. 
 
The first occurrences of the notion of anarchy can be traced back to the Ancient Greek 
Literature. For ancient Greeks, Law is far more than a collection of written rules enforced by 
institutions to ensure the smooth operation of society. They believed that human actions are 
also bound by equity, which is a system of natural justice that allows a fair judgment in a 
situation that is not covered by the existing laws (Hornby et al., 2000); equity is essentially 
driven by shame, a feeling that was allegedly given to people by Hermes (Plato, 1991).  
 
This duality of Law is ideally reflected in ‘Seven Against Thebes,’ Aeschylus’s final tragedy 
in the Oedipus trilogy, where Antigone defies an edict that prohibits the burial of her brother, 
at the cost of her own life (Aeschylus, 1991). When the king asks Antigone how she dared 
defy his edict, she explains that no written law is more important than the longstanding 
tradition of burying the dead with all the ceremony necessary for the occasion, rituals and 
honours (Sophocles, 2003): 
 
“It wasn’t Zeus, not in the least, who made this proclamation – not to me. Nor did 
that justice, dwelling with the gods beneath the earth, ordain such laws for men. 
Nor did I think your edict had such force that you, a mere mortal, could override 
the gods, the great unwritten, unshakable traditions.” 
 
The struggle between written law and equity, and the debate on which of the two is more 
important, was a source of inspiration for philosophers like the Stoics and the Cynics, who are 
now considered as early proponents of the political philosophy of anarchism. Zeno of Citium, 
the founder of the Stoic philosophy is perhaps the greatest exponent of anarchist philosophy 
in ancient Greece (Kropotkin, 1910); his conception of a free community without government 
was directly opposed to the state-utopia of Plato, although the latter does admit in his 
‘Dialogues,’ that no law or ordinance is mightier than understanding (Plato, 2005).  
 
A major assumption of moral philosophy is that individuals take responsibility for their 
actions, and as such, according to Kant, they are metaphysically free (Castoriadis and Curtis, 
1997; Dworkin, 1988; Wolff, 1970). Various moral philosophers, from Kant to Nietzsche, and 
from Royce to Popper, argue for the necessity or desirability of individuals to define or 
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choose their own moral code. So, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and 
responsibility, and it entails submission to laws that one has made for oneself (Dworkin, 
1988; Wolff, 1970). In this respect, any individual making moral decisions and expressing 
them to himself as imperatives, is actually giving laws to himself and is not subject to the will 
of another and thus, he is autonomous (Dworkin, 1988; Wolff, 1970).  
 
Autonomy is a fundamental premise of philosophical anarchism, which advocates that all 
authority is essentially illegitimate and that it is imposed on people more as a moral 
obligation, rather than anything else (Courpasson and Dany, 2003; Wolff, 1970). In anarchist 
studies, this binding moral obligation enforced through institutions, is largely responsible for 
forcing individuals to forfeit their autonomy, in different occasions and for different periods 
of time (Wolff, 1970). However, the moral obligation to authority is not the only reason for 
individuals to forfeit their autonomy. More specifically, Wolff (1970) identifies a paradox that 
is still taking place nowadays; although individuals increasingly recognize their right and duty 
to be their own master, they are, at the same time, becoming the passive objects of technology 
and bureaucracy, whose complexities they cannot fully understand (Wolff, 1970). 
Complementary to this, Dworkin (1988) argues that certain personality types, social classes or 
cultures are less keen to exercise their capacity to be autonomous, while others are more keen 
to do so. In other words, the very conceptualization and use of autonomy varies widely across 
different cultural and organizational contexts. 
 
For this reason, the Kantian perspective, as well as Wolff’s anarchist view on autonomy, have 
been heavily criticised as a futile attempt to reconcile objectivity and autonomy (Castoriadis 
and Curtis, 1997; Dworkin, 1988). Dworkin (1988) first introduced the ‘hierarchical’ or ‘split-
level’ view of the self in modern philosophy, by suggesting that persons have first-order and 
second-order desires, and that their second-order desires and volitions play a decisive role in 
whether the first-order desires will be eventually accepted or rejected (Dworkin, 1988; 
Haworth, 1991). In this respect, autonomy is a second-order capacity of individuals to reflect 
critically on their first-order preferences, wishes, values etc., and most importantly, the 
capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values 
(Haworth, 1991). Dworkin calls ‘conceptual independence,’ the way in which this reflection 
actually occurs, and he distinguishes it from the substantive independence that is used in 
moral philosophy (Dworkin, 1988; Haworth, 1991). After showing that every 
conceptualization of autonomy referring solely to the substantive independence of the 
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individual, leads to theoretical mistakes about political and moral authority, he suggests that 
the former type of independence is much more important for autonomy; however, he does 
admit that both types of independence are absolutely necessary requirements of autonomy, 
(Dworkin, 1988; Haworth, 1991). So, in Dworkin’s theory of autonomy, moral autonomy is 
just a particular case of the wider definition he deploys (Haworth, 1991). 
 
The significance of Dworkin’s work on autonomy is not limited to the introduction of the 
hierarchical view of the self. His discussion on the practical implications of autonomy in 
issues like the role of autonomy in healthcare, proxy and informed consent, behaviour and self 
control, paternalism and entrapment, are also considered major contributions in autonomy 
studies (Haworth, 1991). However, Cornelius Castoriadis, the most prominent contemporary 
philosopher of autonomy, took that concept to a higher level by developing the ‘project of 
autonomy;’ an ambitious account of autonomy based on the radical imagination of society. 
 
4.3 Autonomy as radical imagination 
The entire work of Cornelius Castoriadis is a political philosophy, in which he is mostly 
preoccupied with autonomy as a grand ongoing revolutionary project (Castoriadis and Curtis, 
1988; 1997). His perspective on both individual and social autonomy is particularly radical 
and political; for example, he believes that radical and substantial changes cannot occur in the 
context of a civil society movement, and that instead a ‘rupture’ with the system is required 
(Gezerlis, 2001). However, certain parts of his overall work can be adopted and applied to 
organizational theory, and by extension, to the social aspects of computer security.   
 
It could be argued that the ultimate goal of the ‘project of autonomy’ is the creation of a new 
eidos (είδος = kind) of society, and a new eidos of individuals (Castoriadis, 1987; 1994):  
 
“Autonomy is not closure, but rather, opening: ontological opening, the 
possibility of going beyond the informational, cognitive and organizational 
closure characteristic of self-constituting, but heteronomous beings. It is 
ontological opening, since to go beyond this closure signifies altering the already 
existing cognitive and organizational ‘system,’ therefore constituting one’s world 
and one’s self according to other laws, therefore creating a new ontological eidos 
(kind), another self in another world. This possibility appears, only with the 
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human. It appears as the possibility of challenging (not by chance or blindly, but 
knowing that one is doing so), one’s own laws, one’s own institution when society 
is involved.”  
 
Castoriadis (1992) fundamentally believes that in an autonomous society the following laws 
can substantially express freedom: 
− The execution of decisions takes place only after the egalitarian participation of all 
individuals in the making of the decisions, and 
− Laws are posited with the egalitarian participation of all individuals. 
 
However, when referring to the concept of ‘egalitarian participation,’ Castoriadis does take 
into account the various shortcomings that stem from the self-limitation of democracy; he 
specifically calls democracy ‘the only tragic political regime’ that faces the possibility of its 
self-destruction openly (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1997).  
 
His conceptualization of freedom implies that autonomous individuals can fully exist only in 
an autonomous society, and in turn an autonomous society can only consist of autonomous 
individuals (Castoriadis, 1987; Castoriadis and Curtis, 1988; 1992; 1997). The major 
presupposition of such a society is the possibility of questioning tradition, and of course, the 
enactment of this possibility (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1988; 1992; 1997). Individuals are 
expected collectively to create the rules they should abide to, being completely aware of this 
process, and most importantly, being prepared to change those rules when they become 
inappropriate or inadequate in any way (Castoriadis, 1987; Castoriadis and Curtis, 1992).  
 
So, Castoriadis, too, moves away from the Kantian notion of autonomy, and approaches 
individual autonomy with the help of Freudian psychoanalysis. He suggests that autonomy is 
an endless and unlimited reflection and self-questioning of the institutions and the individual, 
by the individual, and for the benefit of the individual and the society (Castoriadis, 1987; 
Castoriadis and Curtis, 1988; 1997). This reflection depends decisively on the social 
fabrication of the individual (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1992). Notions such as ‘inner freedom’ 
and ‘free will’ have different meanings and connotations in different societies. Their 
manifestation and use varies greatly, and it largely depends on the very institution of society 
and by extent, on the kind of individual this institution ultimately produces (Castoriadis, 
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1987; Castoriadis and Curtis, 1992). The self-institution of society, which is a characteristic of 
autonomous societies, becomes possible with the formation of a ‘social imaginary’ and the 
realization of ‘praxis.’ 
 
The ‘social imaginary’ of a society is a term used by Castoriadis to describe the society’s 
creative ability, the unfolding human potentialities, which creates the significations society 
needs in order to determine its values, and moreover, the institutions that embody these values 
(Gezerlis, 2001). These significations are indispensable for all individuals, in the sense that 
they allow individuals to transform from ‘wailing newborn species of Homo sapiens’ into 
‘Spartans, Dogons, New Yorkers’ (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1997). In other words, the social 
imaginary is the creation of a world of meanings that ultimately institute the values and 
hierarchies of social life, and also establishes the ways in which individuals are fabricated 
within society (Castoriadis, 1987; Castoriadis and Curtis, 1992); and so, institutions are 
symbolic networks that essentially combine imaginary and functional elements (Castoriadis, 
1987; Gezerlis, 2001).  
 
Praxis, on the other hand, is ‘what intends the development of autonomy as its end and, for 
this end, uses autonomy as its means;’ ‘true politics, true pedagogy, true medicine, to the 
extent that these have ever existed, belong to praxis’ (Castoriadis, 1987; Castoriadis and 
Curtis, 1988). Praxis, is entirely different from the application of a previously existing 
knowledge, and it can only exist as a conscious activity (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1988). The 
knowledge required for the support and realization of praxis is fragmentary and provisional; 
this is because theories can never be exhaustive, and also because enacted praxis is itself 
creating and developing new knowledge (Castoriadis and Curtis, 1988).  
 
5 Discussion 
Interested in computerized bureaucracy, and not in the debate between bureaucracy and post-
bureaucracy-there is no computerized post-bureaucracy!!! 
 
The hypothetical scenario of ‘Fail-safe’ is a fine and, at the same time, typical example of 
austere rule following in a situation of asymmetric information; the commander of the 
bombers could not confirm the attack order, but he nevertheless decided to follow the rules, 
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even though the application of the rules would mean the death of millions of people. In the 
novel, the disaster happened when discretion was not fully exercised, after the occurrence of a 
‘normal accident’; that is, of a systemic accident generated by ‘multiple and unexpected 
interactions of failures’ (Perrow, 1984). 
In reality, on the other hand, a similarly catastrophic scenario of an accidental nuclear war 
never came true in more than 20 cases. This was partly due to a series of safeguarding 
processes and mechanisms; but most importantly, it was thanks to the responsible and 
sensible exercise of discretion, on behalf of those who were in the chain of command, that 
false alarms were eventually interpreted as such (Phillips, 2000). Even in an authoritarian 
environment like the military, where control, discipline and rule following are of paramount 
importance, the exercise of discretion in the cases of the false alarms proved to be 
tremendously beneficial.  
 
In any case, rule bending does occur in the military, as well as in other, less authoritarian 
environments, like for example bureaucracies. Although the view of modern bureaucracies as 
‘total’ organizations is largely exaggerated, it is still interesting to see how non-inclusiveness 
as a fundamental property of bureaucracy, rule-bending behaviour and discretion, can co-exist 
under the same theoretical umbrella; namely that of bureaucracy. We were also keen to see 
whether non-inclusiveness involves brave assumptions regarding the mechanics of 
bureaucracy and the use of discretion within a bureaucracy.  
 
It could be argued that, sometimes, rule-bending behaviour, discretion and autonomy are 
present in contemporary organizations and bureaucracies, only because they are not allowed; 
in such a case, the condition of their possibility is their impossibility and therefore, these 
phenomena are possible, only because they are impossible (Luhmann, 2002).   
 
Modern bureaucracies are the creation of empirical hybrids that have been developed over 
time, and which move away from the Weberian ideal type and its classical definition of 
bureaucracy. In today’s ‘soft’ bureaucracies, management uses discretion and autonomy, 
essentially as buzzwords and ‘management fads’ (Abrahamson, 1996; Kieser, 1997; Samonas 
and Angell, 2009). Terms like ‘regulated’ and ‘professional’ autonomy or ‘active discretion,’ 
are coined to grasp different perspectives of the granting of a degree of limited personal 
judgment and assessment to staff (Galligan, 1986; Hoggett, 1996; Samonas and Angell, 
2009). The metaphor of ‘the hole in the doughnut’ illustrates that discretion is an open area 
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surrounded by a belt of restrictions. and by extension that there can be no discretion without 
rules, as there can be no ‘hole’ without a ‘doughnut’ (Dworkin, 1977; Samonas and Angell, 
2009).   
 
The complexity and multidimensionality of the tension between rule compliance and rule 
bending are similar to the ever-lasting problems of existential philosophy, which cannot 
possibly be resolved. However, there are certain pragmatic dimensions of this problem, that 
one can easily identify. In the Statesman, for example, it is suggested that it is impossible to 
devise laws or rules in general, which are proper for everyone (Plato, 1995): 
 
“And so we must believe that the law-maker who is to watch over the herds and 
maintain justice and the obligation of contracts, will never be able by making 
laws for all collectively, to provide exactly that which is proper for each 
individual.” 
 
So, there will always be some people who will not agree and/or accept the rules, either 
because they feel that the rules are not fair or appropriate, or because the rules do not favour 
and/or serve their organizational political interests. The alignment of different individual’s 
interests and the accommodation of their values under commonly accepted laws is the 
quintessence of politics.  
 
Bureaucracy is not an apolitical institution and, in fact, politics do play a major role in its 
overall operation. In bureaucracy, ‘the degree of bureaucratization is a function of human 
striving’ and the ‘outcome of a contest between those who want it and those who do not,’ and 
it can even lead to an autocratic type of organization (Adler and Borys, 1996; Gouldner, 
1954). This political dimension of bureaucracy directly opposes the Weberian bureaucratic 
property of non-inclusiveness, according to which, the individual cannot possibly reflect on 
his role and his position within the bureaucracy.  
 
In practice, bureaucracy, just like any instance of society and organization, operates in a 
‘realpolitik’ mode, and in direct contrast to what the Weberian ideal stands for. The 
‘bureaucratic balance of power principle,’ which refers to policy making is indicative of this 
(Wheeler, 1970): 
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“When a conflict over alternative policy proposals arises, they tend to be 
evaluated on the basis of the extent to which they imply an alteration in the 
relative power positions of the various subsystems affected. That decision is 
favored which least disrupts the existing balance of power among the 
subsystems.” 
 
In this context, certain instances of rule-bending could well be considered as a purely political 
behaviour, or as a manifestation of resistance to power (Farrell and Petersen, 1982). So, it 
could be argued that in a bureaucratic system, rules do not necessarily change to maximize its 
efficiency or to reflect to changes of the environment; rather, changes in the rules of 
bureaucracy are part of a wider a political process, in which the ‘will to power’ of the 
individuals comprising the bureaucracy plays a central role (Nietzsche, 1968): 
 
“Humans create the tensions, conflicts and dynamism in bureaucratic structures 
and, through the exercise of their capacities, reshape the internal structures of 
organization.” (Jaffee, 2001) 
 
Bureaucracy comes full circle by constantly reconfirming and perpetuating its closed-ness, 
without evolving and without essentially transforming its modus operandi. In the ‘glass cages 
and glass palaces’ of ‘soft’ bureaucracies, the fallacy of non-inclusiveness is more evident 
than ever before (Gabriel, 2005). That is why, the non-inclusive forms of human involvement 
in organizations need to be radically redefined (Kallinikos, 2006). We believe that this 
redefinition is possible and feasible in the context of autonomy, and we argue that through 
autonomy, modern organizations can deal with the shortcomings of bureaucracy. But most 
importantly, through autonomy, organizations will become able to address the risks associated 
with computerized bureaucracy; that is, both the opportunities and hazards that lie ahead 
(Angell and Samonas, 2009; Samonas and Angell, 2009).  
 
Let us clarify that we only provide mere descriptions and suggestions, rather than 
prescriptions, and in fact we’re not promoting autonomy as a panacea. Nevertheless, we do 
argue that, especially in the context of organizational integrity, the qualities of autonomy are 
quintessential for the deterrence, correction, prevention, mitigation of risks, as well as for the 
recovery from a breach (Samonas and Angell, 2009). In this respect, autonomy should be seen 
as a necessary e-ville; that is, as an integral part of any preventive and curative security 
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policy, and an unavoidable step towards organizational integrity. With autonomy, positive 
results cannot possibly be guaranteed in advance, because it is only after it is applied that we 
can know if and how successful it has been; and this characteristic of autonomy is very much 
similar to that of hazard (Angell and Ilharco, 2004). Therefore, autonomy should be treated 
itself as a risk (opportunity and hazard). Of course, this tautological statement means much 
and nothing; it is a pragmatic statement that bluntly recognizes the inherently paradoxical 
nature of categories, terminologies and methodologies, while at the same time appreciating 
the added value they offer when they are used sensibly.  
 
It seems that there is a longstanding need for elements of the notion of autonomy that we have 
presented in this paper, so the issue of autonomy is certainly not new (Harrell and Alpert, 
1979). However, in organizational settings, autonomy is either banned or put up with, and 
sometimes even genuinely encouraged, and in this latter case it can indeed lead to innovation 
and evolution. In an organizational context, the concept of autonomy stresses the need for the 
development of an ‘organizational collective imagination’, an ‘organizational imaginary’ in 
Castoriadis’s terminology, that signifies the creative ability of the organization, and exploits 
the richness of human capacity (Robinson and Aronica, 2009). As Ken Robinson notes in 
describing the value and mechanics of creativity, being wrong does not necessarily mean that 
someone is creative; creativity is all about ‘being prepared to be wrong’ (Robinson and 
Aronica, 2009).  
 
In business, failure is a prerequisite of invention and failure-tolerant leaders are those who 
help staff overcome their fear of failure through their words and actions, thus creating an 
organizational culture of ‘intelligent risk’ that leads and nurtures sustained innovation. 
(Farson and Keyes, 2002). Staff are then preoccupied with learning and reflecting on their 
experiences, rather than solely thinking in terms of success or failure (Farson and Keyes, 
2002). In this educational process, mistakes can substantially enhance individual and 
organizational learning, and become the ‘signposts on the road to success’ (Farson and Keyes, 
2002). 
 
However, autonomy can also turn into a substantial hazard. In business environments, for 
example, it has been noted that too much autonomy can sometimes have adverse effects on 
the team productivity (Sethi et al., 2002). Recent research findings indicate that, within limits, 
when senior management is closely monitoring a team, then the team immediately appreciates 
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the importance of their project (Sethi et al., 2002). Of course, autonomy does not imply 
complete lack of supervision or responsibility, quite the contrary. So, it is essential to stress 
once again that a pragmatic and sensible approach is required and a balance between neglect 
and excessive control should be sought (Samonas and Angell, 2009; Sethi et al., 2002).  
 
Autonomy needs to be treated and used with care for yet another reason; theories of autonomy 
have been traditionally developed within a radical humanist paradigm and so, they 
fundamentally lie on an idealist belief in the human potential (Burrell and Morgan, 1985). As 
the term ‘idealist’ implies, this belief is lacking essential practical considerations about the 
human nature and potential. So why and how can autonomy contribute to the mitigation of 
security risks and ultimately, the strengthening of organizational integrity?  
 
We argue that the application of certain aspects of the Castoriadian ‘autonomy’ in 
organizations could lead to an ongoing humanistic educational process that is based on self-
reflection and self-governance (Rogers, 1969). Our view of management, and security 
management in particular, is clearly inspired by the values of radical humanism (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1985; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Furthermore, we recognize that scientific 
approaches and categorizations cannot be used as solutions because they are a problem in 
themselves (Angell and Ilharco, 2004). In this context, we suggest that epistemological 
anarchism can sufficiently address two highly important issues that are related to computer 
security (Feyerabend, 1987; Feyerabend, 1975). First, the complex and challenging nature of 
computer security, and second, the apparent demise of the Information Security Department 
in modern organizations, which has been recently brought to light in various particular cases 
(see for example, the case of Paul Moore at HBOS), where decent security professionals have 
been sacked just for doing their job (BBC, 2009a; b)! 
 
We do believe that security awareness and training, even as they are being performed 
nowadays, are indeed important, however they fail to develop any key skills and 
competencies of staff and therefore, they are largely inadequate. Being informed is one thing; 
being ready to deal with security breaches and disasters when they happen, is something 
completely different. Organizations and firms really need to move a step forward; they need 
to cultivate security education and aim at actively engaging their staff in the security process. 
Security education should be a creative and ongoing process that should be ideally based on 
the creativity and imagination of staff.  
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The ultimate goal of the use of autonomy is to nurture ‘autonomous managers,’ rather than 
create ‘managerial automatons.’ The former have a great advantage over the latter; they can 
step outside the system and initiate a process of self-reflection, which can constructively help 
them in their thoughts, decisions and interpretations of the world. Individual and collective 
understanding of the issues of security and systemic integrity in organizations is of paramount 
importance, especially since ‘no law or ordinance is mightier than understanding’ (Plato, 
2005). On this basis, we do stress the need for security awareness in organizations (Johnson, 
2006; Karyda et al., 2005; Leach, 2003); but most importantly, we strongly emphasize the 
need for an elaborate and ‘humanistic’ security education programme that will actively 
engage both the management and the staff alike, in the endless pursuit for organizational and 
systemic integrity (Rogers, 1969; Samonas and Angell, 2009). 
 
6 Conclusion 
“Nobody seems to know much about how organizations operate in untroubled 
times; the day-to-day, routine existence of organizations is not given much 
attention. In the world of theories, organizations seem to hop along from crisis to 
crisis and to do nothing very interesting in between.”  (Weick, 1995) 
 
It could well be argued that bureaucracy is a paradigm of organizational structure, and as 
such, it is a set of epistemological and ontological presuppositions and properties (Garvey, 
1997); therefore, it is a mere description of the world, or in Castoriadis’s words, a symbolic 
signification (Castoriadis, 1987). As he argues, ‘total order’ and ‘total disorder’ are limiting 
concepts of reality, rather than components of the real, and this practically means that if they 
are considered in absolute terms, they become ‘illegitimate’ and ‘incoherent’ (ibid). 
 
In this respect, every human action (even the very writing of these lines) and much more, 
every observation and interpretation of human action, is solely based on categories; that is, on 
‘subjective’ first-order observations, where the observer has no other choice, but to come up 
with categories in order to make sense of the world (Luhmann, 2002). However, the issue is 
whether these distinctions and categories are of certain utility value to the observer, and if 
they are appropriate for the context in which they are used. The purpose of our analysis of 
bureaucracy is clearly not to suggest that the categories upon which bureaucracy has 
developed are useless or inappropriate, quite the contrary. Bureaucracy is an outstanding 
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mode of management, but only in ‘normal,’ ‘regular’ conditions and situations (Angell and 
Samonas, 2009; Samonas and Angell, 2009). However, we do want to stress that in theory, in 
the first instance, bureaucratic theory is lacking consistency, just like any theory does 
(Luhmann, 1995; 2002).  
 
Computers can deal with objectivity, that is with well-structured problems, with an amazing 
speed and in detail, but they cannot cope with subjectivity, subtlety and ambiguity (Angell 
and Ilharco, 2004). Computerization is a ‘prisoner of societal consequences,’ which cannot 
possibly be controlled, regardless of the management’s initiatives and good intentions (Angell 
and Ilharco, 2004). However, there are still many managers who believe that most of their 
problems can be sufficiently addressed by the computerization of organizational tasks, 
processes and ways of problem-solving (Angell and Ilharco, 2004; Inbar, 1979).  
 
Computers systems do become autonomous at some point, and they impose their own modus 
operandi, which need to be absolutely accepted and followed by all staff. As we have argued 
in our trilogy of papers, computerized bureaucracy can and does generate a whole range of 
risks that are sometimes difficult to mitigate. On the other hand, the partial or full 
computerization of organizational processes and decision-making can create grave problems 
for organizations, and this is clearly illustrated in the countless errors in systems design that 
never cease to occur.  
 
According to Angell (2004), computerization has gradually led managers to an ‘obsessive 
compulsive neurosis’ that urgesthem to strive constantly to tidy up the world; in other words, 
to ‘strive for failure’ (Ciborra, 2002). Neurotic organizations usually attract tidy minds and in 
this way, they ultimately reinforce organizational neuroses (Angell and Ilharco, 2004; Kets de 
Vries, 1991; Kets de Vries and Miller, 1984). The problem, of course, is that the intrinsic 
ambiguity and complexity, which are prevalent in organizational environments, cannot be 
dealt with the functionalist methodologies that are still out there; the neo-functionalist 
methodologies are dressed with the clothes of ‘groundbreaking’ frameworks that essentially 
rely on superficial accounts of individuality, management, organization and society itself.  
 
Plans, intentions, or technologies do not drive action, on the contrary they misguide it. Action 
is driven by the disposition in which the company, as a whole, grasps the environment; action 
is influenced by describing, thinking and reflecting, activities than can transform the ongoing 
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activity of living beings, because ‘thinking changes the world’ (Angell and Ilharco, 2004; 
2009; Heidegger, 1984). This is the spirit of autonomy, and this is the essence of its 
contribution, not only for security professionals, but also for organizations as a whole.  
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